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Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America

Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America: A Comparative Study of New York
City and philadelphia Politics
Justin Greenman
Introduction:
The decades before the American Civil War would be a
period of great change for America’s two largest cities, New York
City and Philadelphia. At the turn of the 19th century, New York
City was still socially homogenous, with few immigrants and a
uniform, simple economy. But, as its economic and social power
grew with the development of new industries and the growth
of interstate commerce, immigration to the city skyrocketed.
Immigrants flooded the physically expanding city from New
England, from the countryside of upstate New York, and from
overseas, to the point where by 1860 it had 813,660 residents.
Thus, by 1860 New York City was America’s financial and social
capital, the “capital of capital” as historian John Strausbaugh
put it.1 1860 Philadelphia had a population of 565,529, behind
only London, Paris, and New York City. Like New York City and
most northern metropolises, its immigrants were primarily Irish
and German (16.7 and 7.5 percent in Philadelphia, respectively.)
However, unlike New York City, it had a vibrant native-born
citizenry, whether anti-slavery heirs of the City of Brotherly
Love’s Quaker founders, members of its 400 churches and nearly
one thousand organized lodges, clubs, and benefit associations,
or Southern businessmen moving North for greater economic
opportunities.2 For these long-time Philadelphia residents, the
Civil War, and the resulting political and social changes to their
city, would be a time of reckoning for their long-held beliefs.
As national centers of commerce and society, New York
City and Philadelphia are crucial to understanding the national
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political and ideological changes and movements that occurred
during the Civil War. Throughout the war, both cities would
serve as microcosms for the political and ideological changes
that befell the rest of the Union. In the historical memory and
common knowledge of New York City and Philadelphia during
the war, the two cities have acquired contrasting perceptions.
New York City, in large part thanks to its well-documented
draft riots, is perceived as a disloyal, racist city. Philadelphia,
in large part thanks to its colonial legacy and lack of similar
riots or anti-Lincoln actions, is perceived as a loyal and pro-war
city. In reality, however, the truth about each city’s loyalty and
disloyalty is somewhere between the reputations given to them
by the passage of time. Neither New York City nor Philadelphia
fit into the perfect picture of the “loyal city” or “disloyal city”
that they have been placed into by popular memory. Both cities
faced pitched electoral clashes that could have easily taken their
cities in different political directions, and no political outcome
in either city was preordained.
Comparatively studying New York City and
Philadelphia revealed the fascinating differences with which
politically active citizens, especially elected officials and
party leaders, positioned themselves in relation to the war
effort. Yet, one facet that united political actors divided by
different viewpoints and residing in different cities was their
use of definitions of loyalty and disloyalty. Analyzing either
city through definitions of loyalty and disloyalty is a rare
historiographical occurrence; nevertheless, conceptions of
loyalty and disloyalty are crucial for this study. In a conflict as
divisive as the Civil War, both cities were split between many
vocal factions that argued they were the only ones truly loyal
to the nation while their opponents were just disloyal agitators.
They also sought to control and alter situations when the
disloyalty label was directed at them. Thus, this work will be a
critical reinterpretation of how we, now over 155 years since the
end of the Civil War, see those who practiced politics in New
Penn History Review
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York City and Philadelphia during the conflict.
Even those actors already given some scholarly
treatment deserve to be recontextualized within the framework
of loyalty and disloyalty. The New York City or Philadelphia
leader who receives the most scholarly treatment is Fernando
Wood. Twice elected mayor of New York City, including serving
as its first war-time mayor, and later a congressman, Wood is
the focus of two well-researched books, various articles, and
plays an integral role in most stories of New York City during
the war. While most of the works repeat facts and arguments
about his life story, there is a notable disagreement that this
thesis will relitigate and seek to solve. Was Wood a disloyal,
political opportunist masking or deploying his opposition to
the war at different times when it was politically advantageous,
or was he a loyal leader who stuck by his principles even forced
to adapt to changing circumstances like everyone else? All in
all, through Wood’s winding wartime career while there were
shades of the latter, he was a politician first, willing to sacrifice
his party and principles, and in one case his state’s safety, for
political gain. Other political actors of different degrees of
notoriety will also be recontextualized within this question, and
while they all were political opportunists to varying degrees,
none were as overtly duplicitous as Wood was.
Beyond Wood, both cities are also filled with partisan
actors seeking to utilize the Civil War to push forward their
vision for their city. While there are too many to cover in detail,
this work will examine many based on their connections to
the different intraparty factions of both cities. The politics of
both cities were defined by constant party feuds that at times
allowed for political and electoral success, but most often led
to disaster. The New York City Democratic Party alone had
three powerful factions, Tammany Hall, Mozart Hall, and the
McKeon Democracy, all of whom will receive their due. New
York City Republicans were divided between a more moderate
faction led by New York Times editor Henry Raymond and a
12
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more radical faction led by New York Tribune editor Horace
Greeley. At different points in the war, these factions stood
for different positions and achieved different levels of success.
For instance, while Raymond’s faction originally opposed
President Lincoln’s policies, by war’s end they were amongst
his most powerful backers. Greeley’s faction helped deliver him
the 1860 Republican nomination and then soured on him as
the war progressed. The reason for this shift will be examined,
occurring based on the evolving popularity of Lincoln and his
wartime policies, and what they meant for this intraparty power
struggle. Philadelphia, on the other hand, was less defined by
interparty or intraparty feuds. Rather, it was characterized more
by a divide between a bipartisan, pro-war consensus under
Alexander Henry and out-of-power Democrats and Republicans
who wanted a seat at the table but were never popular enough
to receive one. The reason for this composition of Philadelphia
politics will be examined. All in all, Henry’s desire for
bipartisanship and consensus was successful, in large part due
to a healthy use of police power, which allowed Philadelphia to
avoid most of the divisiveness and bloodshed that befell New
York City.
Besides political leaders, and their parties and coalitions,
there are other key avenues to understand the intersections of
the cities. For example, both cities had a rich heterogeneous
mix of newspapers that were important for the politicization
of those who led and were led alike. In 19th century America,
newspapers were crucial prognosticators and disseminators of
political thought, allowing everyday citizens, regardless of their
education or political knowledge, to glean their own personal
views from the opinions of their favorite newspaper. As Edward
Dicey, a British journalist visiting America during the Civil
War, put it, “In truth, the most remarkable feature about
the American press is its quantity rather than its quality. The
American might be defined as a newspaper-reading animal…
Reading is so universal an acquirement here, that a far larger,
Penn History Review
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and also a far lower, class reads the newspapers than is the
case with us.”3 The papers, whether affiliated with politically
independent or with a party or faction, still hoped to influence
political parties and leaders. New York City especially was
dominated by an ideological battle between its three most
influential newspapers: Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune,
Henry Raymond’s New York Times, and Fernando Wood’s New
York Daily News. Their constant battle to define themselves
as loyal, and their competitors (and thus their competitors’
readers) as disloyal would demonstrate the simmering tension
between New York City’s ideological and ethnic communities.
Due to their ties to a party faction, these newspapers
successfully captured the views of their faction and its
struggles, or outright refusal, to adjust as the national political
circumstances changed. On the other hand, Philadelphia’s
papers, while ideological, had few connections to organized
politics, and thus politically evolved with much of the country
as the war progressed.
This section, of a larger work encompassing the years
1859-1865, covers 1859-1861, examining how the quick
rhetorical shifting, by both parties, from opposition to civil
war to full-throated pro-war, anti-South oratory obscured
real political divisions about loyalty. While in the end loyalty
as constructed as supporting Lincoln and the war effort fully
would win out in both cities over loyalty as constructed as
supporting a party or a pre-war national construct, it was by
no means an easy decision for either city and for those who
led them. At times, the first construction would even be the
most unpopular view of loyalty, especially during periods
of Democratic control and when the Union war effort was
struggling the most. By the end of the war, while many of the
political leaders and factions evolved with their city’s residents
towards the first definition of loyalty, others would refuse to
evolve despite great pressure, to varying degrees of negative
electoral and personal consequences. In that case, the differences
14
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between the cities plays a deciding role, where in New York
City those who sought bipartisanship failed completely,
while their counterparts in Philadelphia succeeded. Likewise,
while Democrats virtually disappeared from elected office in
Philadelphia, in New York City they ruled for most of the war,
even after a significant portion of their base rioted in the streets.
In truth, throughout the war there was no simple
answer about what loyalty and disloyalty meant. Many in both
parties would vehemently resist any definition but their own.
While I know that my work will not lead to a simple answer
about the roles of loyalty and disloyalty in political action and
discourse, I hope that my use of the best of the scholarship
combined with primary sources to fill its gaping holes will help
conclude that one’s loyalty and disloyalty could not be judged
by one’s partisan identification or political allies. It especially
cannot be judged by one’s rhetoric, which was often vague at
best and deceitful of one’s true intentions at worst. In fact, if
there is one conclusion that this paper easily makes, it is that
there were no universally agreed upon, or even mostly agreed
upon, definitions of what constituted loyalty and disloyalty,
only subjective opinions altered by time and animated by
politics.
New York City and Philadelphia: The Early Days of the Split
For New York City and Philadelphia Democrats
and Republicans leaders alike, April 12th, 1861 would mark
a turning point from their pre-war attitudes towards the
Union, secession, and other contentious issues. Democrats
and Republicans, and their powerful political and media
leaders, would immediately walk back much of the criticism
they leveled at President Lincoln and the possibility of war.
Both sides would go to great lengths to trumpet their loyalty
to the war effort, seeking to outflank their opponents as the
most loyal. It appeared that the coming of war would bring
Penn History Review
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an end to the discordant Northern politics of the 1850s and
usher in a new era of bipartisan cooperation. But, these public
demonstrations of agreement would be both short-lived and
ultimately unsuccessful attempts at unity. By the end of the
year, interparty and intraparty rivalries would resume, with
efforts by politicians in both parties to denigrate others as
disloyal to the war effort when it was still broadly popular
and to highlight their own ideological principles to their
supporters once it was not. These divisions in New York City
and Philadelphia would be magnified by the contentious and
divisive city elections in 1861, setting the stage for an even
more contentious and divisive 1862.
However, to best understand where both parties and
their heterogeneous factions would end up by 1862, it is
necessary first to determine where they started. For both cities,
the years immediately preceding the war were marked by
political turbulence. Old political alliances and ideologies were
chaotically rejected and replaced, as different groups and ideas
jockeyed for power. The result would be the transformation of
Philadelphia into a one-party city, a party defined by support
for the Union over traditional party lines, though with a
sizable minority of Democrats and Republicans opposing
the consensus, and of New York City into a city politically
partitioned into three nearly equal parts. Thus, even though
both cities entered the war in relatively similar ideological
positions, they would, thanks to these wartime dynamics, exit
the year completely dissimilar.
For a city north of the Mason-Dixon line, pre-war
Philadelphia was in many ways a Southern city. With its
manufacturing capital greater than the combination of 11
states that would become the Confederacy, it received great
economic investment from wealthy Southerners. These
Southerners did not just send money to Philadelphia; in fact,
many Southerners married into Philadelphia families and
directed their manufacturing empires from within the city. They
16
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then employed poor whites, often immigrants, and allied with
them politically by focusing on a supposedly shared hatred for
the city’s growing free black population. For decades before
the war, these ties to the South manifested in clear voting
preferences for Southern economic interests and led to massive
Democratic electoral success in the city. In the city’s 1856
presidential election, Republican John C. Fremont received
11% of the vote, with the Democrats procuring a majority, and
its burgeoning Know-Nothing Party forced to suppress many
of its anti-slavery supporters.4 As Charles Godfrey Leland, a
Philadelphia satirist, put it, “everything Southern was exalted
and worshipped.”5
One example of something Southern exalted in
Philadelphia was fear and, in many, overt hatred towards the
city’s free blacks. As previously established, some of the hatred
felt by the city’s workers towards black residents was promoted
by direct propaganda from the city’s Southern business leaders.
Yet, most of the hatred felt by Philadelphians of all walks of
life towards free blacks came from their unmistakable presence,
constituting four percent of Philadelphia’s population. Though
on the surface small, they were the largest black community in
the North, and second only to Baltimore’s. Furthermore, they
disproportionately lived in wards closest to the city’s major
political and social institutions and often worked in economic
sectors like menial labor and domestic work that kept them
in poverty and near the city elite.6 Thus it is clear that in
Philadelphia, the controversy over black rights in city society, or
lack thereof, was more omnipresent than seemingly far-fetched
fears of secession or unrelatable issues like Bleeding Kansas.
Yet in pre-war Philadelphia, free blacks were more than
just a nuisance or something to fear; they were also a direct
target of restrictive political measures. Blacks were stuck in
low-level menial labor or domestic work because of economic
restrictions passed by Southern-allied Democrats and supported
by the white worker base. Employment in new factories built
Penn History Review
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by Southerners was closed to blacks, membership in trade
groups was barred, and Democratic state legislatures mandated
separate schools for blacks long before Plessy vs. Ferguson.7
While New York City has a more developed reputation for
racism during the era, contemporary abolitionists actually
thought Philadelphia was worse. The abolitionist William
Wells Brown said that in Philadelphia, “Colorphobia is more
rampant here than in the pro-slavery, negro-hating city of New
York.”8 Frederick Douglass went even further, saying “There
is not perhaps anywhere to be found a city in which prejudice
against color is more rampant than in Philadelphia...The whole
aspect of city usage at this point is mean, contemptible, and
barbarous…”9 Unfortunately, even the war would not alter
many of these obstructions and the city’s views of blacks would
alter the rhetoric and policies of even more or less sympathetic
political leadership.
The rise to power of an opposition party after such
a Democratic landslide in 1856 illustrated how quickly new
alliances could be created, be successful, and then immediately
face the possibility of dissolution. It may be surprising that
out of this virulently pro-Democrat, pro-South, and anti-black
political structure, the Democratic Party would be displaced
just two years later by an upstart party that stood against most
of its core tenets. But, in reality, this displacement marked a
major political realignment that befell much of the North,
but especially Philadelphia. In the wake of Bleeding Kansas in
1855 and the Dred Scott Supreme Court case in 1857, new
political coalitions were formed across the North to oppose
the Democratic Party and its increasing agreement with the
Southern ideology on slavery. Compromised of disaffected
Democrats, former Whigs, nativists, and Free Soilers, these
coalitions often struggled to succeed because of disagreements
over the extent to which growing anti-slavery and antiimmigration ideologies should be emphasized. Those in
Philadelphia came together in 1857 to form a new political
18
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party, the Peoples Party.
The Peoples Party avoided the fate that befell other antiDemocrat coalitions by promising to ignore both slavery and
nativism. They would only support popular sovereignty, not
even abolition in new territories, and nativists would have to
be satisfied with a lip-service plank of “Protection of American
Labor against the Pauper Labor of Europe.”10 Rather than
focus on what divided them, they focused on what they agreed
on: the party portrayed Democrats as the aggressors on the
question of slavery in an appeal to those who may nominally
be Democrats, but still worried that slavery was bringing the
country to the brink of Civil War.11 The Democratic Party
was still a strong force, castigating the Peoples Party as the
“‘Mulatto’ Party, offspring of miscegenation between the
Americans and ‘Black Republicans.’” One Democratic speaker
at an 1858 rally even argued that if the Peoples Party won, the
state should go with the South before Republicans destroyed
the national confederacy.12 Yet, in 1858 the new party would
notch its first major electoral success, defeating the incumbent
Democratic mayor and replacing him with one of their own,
Alexander Henry. Therefore, it is clear that while Philadelphia
had many Southern inclinations, they would not remain fully
intact as the Civil War approached.
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Alexander Henry, unknown author and
date.

Alexander Henry, a wealthy young lawyer, hoped his
term could avoid controversy while using his power to focus
on his main legislative priority: improving the city’s public
transportation. That his main policy goal was completely
divorced from national politics reveals the tightrope that the
Peoples Party sought to walk. Despite his victory, however,
Henry’s influence and power over the city was tenuous at best.
At any moment, the fragile alliance that brought him to power
could collapse over internal divisions, allowing the Democratic
Party to regain its usual power. Furthermore, the Peoples
Party cannot be equated with the Republican Party; a separate
political organization used the Republican name to push Henry
and his allies towards a more candid antislavery position.13 His
balancing act became more difficult after John Brown’s raid
the next year. The raid would greatly polarize Philadelphia,
convincing the city’s previously quiet abolitionists to schedule
a public meeting at Independence Hall on the day of his
execution. The audience at the meeting was divided between
20
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abolitionists, black residents, and Southern sympathizers, and
order was only ensured by the 120 policemen sent by Mayor
Henry to attend the event. He would later use the police again
to bar abolitionists from meeting Brown’s body when it passed
through the city after his death and to stop Democrats from
attacking New York abolitionist George Curtis as he lectured at
the Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Fair.14
Henry’s use of the city’s police force to maintain calm
between divided factions would later become a hallmark
of his administration and of the power of the Philadelphia
mayoralty. The roots of this power actually came from a
recent development in Philadelphia’s political and geographic
evolution. In 1854, Philadelphia consolidated its outlying
communities. Primarily intended to enlarge Philadelphia’s tax
base, this consolidation also realigned political power around its
executive and away from its city council. One key example of
the increased power of the Philadelphia mayoralty was regarding
the police. Now, each ward had its own police station under the
supervision of a central station at City Hall, which the mayor
controlled. Henry’s predecessors had already tested out the
new police powers, first with the nativist and prohibitionist
Robert Conrad suppressing Sunday newspapers and liquor
sales.15 Out of this recent expansion would come Henry’s key
mechanism for guiding his city through its darkest hours. The
fact that wartime New York City had no such power vested in
its mayor would one day restrain the leadership efforts of its
non-Democratic leadership.
Despite trying to evenly utilize force against and on
behalf of all political factions, Henry’s measures were wildly
unpopular with much of the city in 1859 and into 1860.
Democratic opponents saw him as a closet abolitionist who
should have instead suppressed the anti-slavery meetings. Henry
seemingly supported this argument by joining Curtis on stage at
his lecture as a symbol of municipal authority and fairness. He
was quickly rebuked in a 16-5 vote by the city’s Select Council,
Penn History Review
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and about a third of the city’s medical students from the South
withdrew from their schools in protest. His political allies were
not much better at supporting him, with many joining the
city’s Republican Party rather than continue suppressing their
views on issues surrounding slavery.16 Pushed in from both
parties, Henry’s power nearly evaporated. Based on precinct
returns from the May 1860 election for the mayoral race, A.K.
McClure, a prominent Philadelphia Republican politician
during the war and an ally of Henry, admitted years later that
Henry was only re-elected because of falsified election returns,
though there is no direct evidence of voter fraud or of Henry’s
knowledge of any falsification.17 Perhaps to show he was still
moderate, or out of legitimate ideological desires, Henry would
end up supporting the Constitution Unionist, John Bell, over
the Republican, Abraham Lincoln, in the 1860 presidential
election. However, the latter’s large victory in the city, a sign
of its continued drift away from the Democratic Party, would
serve as a warning. For the mayor, his power as 1861 began was
a far cry from the mandate he was seemingly given just three
years earlier.
Democrats in the city also refused to give him or
the Peoples Party room to reassure the city that they wanted
reconciliation following Lincoln’s election and the secession
of Southern states. On January 17th, Democrats held a mass
meeting in which they supported Southern secession. One
of the keynote speakers was William Bradford Reed, perhaps
at the pinnacle of his power. Born into Philadelphia’s social
elite, his grandfather served as Pennsylvania’s governor during
the Revolutionary War, even as he was accused of directly
communicating with King George III to betray his erstwhile
friend George Washington. Originally an Anti-Mason and later
a Whig, William Reed quickly irritated friend and foe alike.
As historian Joanna Cowden put it in a very unsympathetic
biography, “Attributing self-serving motives to those who
opposed him, he measured their purity against his own
22
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and found them wanting.” By 1856, he had abandoned the
collapsing Whig Party, allying with many of his former friends
and enemies by joining the Democratic Party.18
Before the switch, Reed was no Southern apologist like
most in the Philadelphia Democratic Party. In his biography
of his grandfather, Reed highlighted his grandfather’s support
for Pennsylvania’s 1780 gradual abolition law as a proud
accomplishment for his state.19 However, once he joined
the Democratic Party, Reed abandoned such praise. Reed
would reject congressional measures imposing limits on slave
ownership in the territories. He would also align himself with
a new home-state ally, the pro-Southern James Buchanan, for
his presidential campaign. Reed would help Buchanan bring
former Whigs like himself into the fold, portraying Buchanan
as a moderate who would “save the country from the fanatical
abolition which has always done wrong to us…”20 After
his victory, Buchanan would reward Reed by making him
Minister to China, a prestigious diplomatic post that solidified
Reed’s prominence and power within the city’s Democratic
establishment. Reed would serve in this position until returning
home in 1859 to defend Buchanan’s policies.
Thus, his 1861 speech was a homecoming for Reed,
and an opportunity for him to stake out an ideological vision
for the Philadelphia Democratic Party. He and the other
speakers, Reed claimed, were there to discuss “conciliation and
none other.” Lincoln’s election had unleashed a “fierce and
feverish spirit” that could only be prevented if the South was
placated. To appease the South, he urged the city’s Democrats
to adopt a course of neutrality to orchestrate a settlement
between those “whose fanaticism has precipitated this misery
upon us” and their “brethren in the South, whose wrongs we
feel as our own.”21 Though Reed did not directly advocate for
secession, his advocacy of neutrality and later support for the
Confederate cause over the Union cause led to that distinction
being forgotten in the years ahead. But at the time, his speech
Penn History Review
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provoked relatively little controversy, as most city residents also
wanted conciliation.
Philadelphia was a city struggling with many competing
impulses in the years before the war. In many ways, it was
a Southern city on par with many below the Mason-Dixon
line. Its economy was closely allied with that of the South, its
political opinions, demonstrated by the overwhelming support
for Democratic candidates and positions, mirrored those of the
South, and its unfortunate attitudes and treatment towards its
black residents, mirrored the economic and social restrictions
free blacks faced in the South. At the same time, antipathy
began to develop against the Democratic Party, culminating
in the election of Alexander Henry as Mayor. Still, there was
no clear break, and Henry struggled throughout his first term
to politically coexist between Southern allies and the growing
Republican Party wanting stricter opposition. Henry also
struggled to utilize a new feature of his position, control of
the police. Furthermore, Democrats still held sway in the
city, as seen by the popular speech of William Reed. A break
would come, but it would take an event as catastrophic as the
attack on Fort Sumter for Henry and his allies to gain an edge
politically over their opponents and for Henry’s police-heavy
strategy to prove effective.
New York City was also greatly divided politically in
the lead up to the Civil War, and, like Philadelphia, residents
faced the question about how close to align their city to the
South. Wealthy New Yorkers, predominantly Democrats after
the collapse of the Whig Party, had a vested economic interest
in the South. New York City, more so than Philadelphia, was a
part of a global trading network, and the most common good
it unloaded in the decades before the war was Southern cotton.
Cotton, of course, required slaves, and as the price of slaves
skyrocketed, New York City banks extended credit to Southern
plantations in exchange for continued access to the cotton
market. Thus, New York City, as opposed to Philadelphia, was
24
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explicitly complicit in slavery.22 Plus, it was an open secret that
despite its nationwide ban in 1808, New York City continued
as a place to import slaves from Africa. In fact, a city newspaper
estimated in 1865 that between 1859 and 1860 alone, 85 ships
had arrived in New York from Africa.
The views of the city on slavery were not all on one
side of the debate though; in reality, New York City was on
two opposing tracks when it came to slavery. Slaves had been
officially manumitted in the city in 1827, a day that saw parades
throughout the city, though mostly with only black residents
participating. It also was home to prominent abolitionists,
like Lewis Tappan, who served as a part of the Underground
Railroad, and was the birthplace of the first black newspaper
in the United States, Freedom’s Journal. Yet even Tappan was a
major Northern trader of Southern cotton. Thus, while New
York City was likely, as one historian later called it, the North’s
most pro-South, anti-abolition city, it had an undercurrent of
dissent and contradictions that would be tested throughout the
Civil War.23
As part of a national party, New York Democrats were
also asked to swallow any misgivings they had about Southern
priorities like slavery and free trade because those in the North
could only win and influence national policy by courting and
winning in the Solid South.24 Thus began a divisive internal
party debate about how accommodating to be, and three
camps were formed. “Hards” were parrots of Southern rhetoric,
arguing the Union had to fully accommodate Southern
expansionist desires. “Softs” advocated for popular sovereignty,
a system devised by Illinois’ Stephen Douglas that allowed
territories to choose for themselves if they wanted to slavery.
Those who refused most or any accommodations with the
South or slavery were “Barnburners,” though most Barnburners
eventually fled to other parties or swallowed their misgivings
for the sake of electoral success and joined one of the other two
factions. While other state and local Democratic parties across
Penn History Review
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the North combusted under the weight of the party’s divisive
policies of the 1850s, New York City’s was unique in that all
these cleavages would mostly last throughout the war, though
the factions took different names.25
Though he was not the cause of the divisions, perhaps
no one embodied these internal divisions better than Fernando
Wood. At the start of the war, Wood was a veteran New York
City politician in his third nonconsecutive term as mayor. He
was also a local, state, and national Democratic power broker
who tried to maintain influence as the city, and his party,
careened through crisis after crisis. All in all, the one constant of
Wood’s political power was that it was never constant. In part
this was because Wood had generally chosen no ideological side
in the great debate over accommodation to the South; he was
neither a Hard nor a Soft. In 1849 he allied with the Softs in
exchange for being the party’s nominee the next year, though
he lost because he refused to endorse the Compromise of 1850
as most other Softs did.26 When he finally won the mayoralty
in 1854, he quickly alienated his supporters within the party
with his patronage choices and public desire to be named Vice
President in 1856. After failing to achieve that position, Wood
had his term shortened by a year by Democrats to allow for
a new election as soon as possible, with the explicit goal of
replacing him.27
All this hostility resulted in Wood being voted out
of office in an 1857 landslide thanks to an unprecedented
fusion of the Know-Nothing and Republican parties with
the anti-Wood members of the Democratic Party behind one
candidate.28 This anti-Wood coalition was primarily composed
of members of Tammany Hall, the city’s Democratic machine
for much of the century. Wood nominally controlled the
machine during his two terms, but after his loss Tammany Hall
replaced one of Wood’s close allies, Gideon Tucker, as a sachem
and forced Wood out as Grand Sachem. Rather than try again
to regain control of the city’s existing Democratic organization,
26
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Wood decided to form his own political organization within
the Democratic Party. Wood had been somewhat of a political
kingmaker before by virtue of being Mayor, but most of his
efforts were futile. For instance, his attempts in 1855 to form an
alliance with Barnburner Democrats did not come to fruition
as both they and Tammany Hall were happy to have them leave
the party.29 Up until that point, even with the party’s internal
divisions, patronage, platforms, and candidates were almost
universally determined by unelected leaders of Tammany Hall
and not by elected officials like Wood.
But Wood sought, even in defeat, to make himself
the decider. He would form Mozart Hall in 1858 to directly
challenge Tammany Hall “until it opened its doors” to his
appointments.30 Wood’s first major success was not political,
but in print. He and his brother bought a failing newspaper
called the New York Daily News, and quickly turned it into a
well-read mouthpiece for Mozart Hall.31 Throughout this time
period, newspapers were often the chief mouthpiece for political
parties and actors to present their ideas and positions to voters,
to attack their opponents, and rally their supporters to their
side. As will be discussed later, this allowed newspaper editors to
possess a great deal of political leverage and wield great political
capital; but, the same held true for elected officials too. Wood
knew that a newspaper supporting Mozart Hall would greatly
increase his reach and impact in city politics. As a supporter
articulated in a letter shortly before the Woods bought the
New York Daily News, “What strikes you of the project? In
case of your approval I would undertake it at once & provide
the necessary materials & force - editorially & otherwise - to
make it worthy of democratic patronage & second to none
of its contemporaries in point of spirit…” For Wood and his
new backers, a newspaper was a crucial tool to regain their lost
influence.32
The problem for Wood, besides the trouble of trying to
supplant an organization with a history and tradition of success
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for decades, was that he had no ideological base of support.
Wood likely underestimated how his constant evolutions
had alienated most political allies and overestimated their
willingness to defect from Tammany too. For instance veteran
city naval leader Prosper Wetmore declined to ally with Wood
in the 1860 elections, saying the offer Wood proffered was
beneath his age and experience.33 Thus, Wood charted a new
path towards being a kingmaker: identity politics among the
city’s Irish. This was not the only strategy he employed though;
for instance, he had used John Brown’s Harpers Ferry raid
that year to great effect as supposed evidence of the dangers of
Republican rule.34
Wood had always pandered to the city’s Irish
community, somewhat ironic since he had joined a local
nativist group in an attempt to coalesce more support for his
1854 run.35 Although their poverty in Ireland and desire for
American prosperity may have led them towards Republican
free labor ideology, they resented Republican alliances with
nativists.36 Since the mass immigration of Irish began in the
1840s, the Democratic Party had been their political home.
But, after forming Mozart Hall, Wood would especially echo
their rhetoric. He was a vocal opponent of prohibition, seen by
many Irish immigrants at the time as a nativist talking point.37
He repeatedly denigrated his opposition as beholden to “British
stockjobbers,” a clear ploy for Anglophobic Irish sentiment.38
But perhaps most importantly, he played on Irish fears of
free black people as the Southerners did in Philadelphia and
throughout the North, convincing them of future economic
and social turmoil from greater black rights. Wood’s appeals
to the Irish would also serve to fill the ranks of leadership in
Mozart Hall since most of the defecting Tammany leaders, like
Charles Daly, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, were Irish
themselves.39
Tammany Hall made a concerted effort leading up to
the 1859 mayoral election to court Wood’s Irish base, promising
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them the share of patronage that had originally prompted Wood
to form Mozart Hall. But Tammany Hall was still an imperfect
messenger for Irish interests, choosing to nominate William
Havemeyer, a German businessman, over the Irish community’s
and Mozart Hall’s preferred candidate, William Kennedy, an
Irish merchant. Havemeyer, and his candidate for the city’s
Corporation Attorney, Samuel Tilden, called themselves “Fifth
Avenue Democrats” based on their residence within the city’s
upper economic echelon anchored at the city’s Fifth Avenue.
They saw their wealth and social presence within the city as an
asset, but most immigrants saw it as something else. Wood’s
mouthpiece, the New York Daily News, repeatedly referred to
Fifth Avenue Democrats “as a kid-glove, scented, silk stocking,
poodle-headed, degenerate aristocracy.” They were also accused
of not being Democrats, having supported the Free-Soil wing of
the party in the prior decade.40
Displeased with Tammany Hall’s decision, Wood
declared his candidacy, which he was not previously planning to
do. Originally running against the coalition that had defeated
him in 1857, his candidacy was aided by the Republican Party’s
decision to nominate their own candidate. Their nominee,
George Opdyke, hoped to appeal to independents and former
Democrats upset by the Party’s pro-Southern stances. However,
the Republicans were still too weak, and ended up siphoning
enough votes from Havemeyer that Wood would shock many
by winning the mayoralty again by a comfortable margin.
Disgusted, Tilden would blame the “ignorant Irish” for their
defeat, further driving the Irish away from Tammany Hall and
that faction’s increasingly wealthy shift.41 All of a sudden, Wood
was once again a power player in city party politics, and those
who once attacked him and kicked him out were now singing
his praises. A. Oakley Hall, a former Whig elected official and
a decade later a Tammany Hall-backed mayor, wrote Wood
that November to thank him for his “olive branch and to know
that you bear no malice for the certainly objectionable language
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displayed by me…which is now heartily withdrawn.”42
The topsy-turvy political odyssey of Fernando Wood
leading up to his surprising re-election as Mayor of New York
City is possibly the best encapsulation of how his political
power and ideals fluctuated. Wood’s primary goal, clearly, was
to acquire and maintain power. To do so, Wood had no qualms
about allying himself with different sides of the intraparty
feud that consumed Democrats in the 1840s and 1850s.
When he alienated too many allies in a quixotic bid for the
vice presidency and lost the mayoralty in 1857, Wood pressed
on, forming a rival Democratic faction to compete against
his long-standing benefactors. With this new faction, Mozart
Hall, Wood sought to encapsulate the pro-Southern ideology
within the Democratic Party and capture the Irish immigrant
demographic that was gaining more political influence every
year in the city. This electoral strategy proved successful,
demonstrating the popularity of his opinions and power of his
constituents; yet, it also represented severe miscalculations by
his old allies in Tammany Hall, their first of many in the years
of the Civil War.
But Wood wanted more than the political comeback he
had surprisingly achieved; he still wanted to be a national power
player. Defeated, Tammany Hall wanted their power back and
control of their city again. In pursuit of their feud, Wood and
Tammany Hall would foster great national conflict within the
Democratic Party at their party convention in 1860. In their
desires for party supremacy, they would refuse to compromise
on a presidential nominee, driving the Democratic Party into
geographic factions that ran two separate campaigns. United,
the Democratic Party may have won the 1860 presidential
election, especially since Lincoln was loathed by much of the
country; divided, they stood no chance against an emboldened
Republican Party. Therefore, while it may be too simple to say
the Tammany Hall-Mozart Hall feud was entirely responsible
for the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, it
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unavoidably played a devastating role.
Wood was what his biographer Jerome Mushkat would
call New York City’s first “prototypical modern municipal
leader, a professional politician seeking to get, keep, maintain,
and expand power.”43 Already established as not content with
the mayoralty, as his predecessors were, he initially hoped to
be nominated for President at the 1860 Democratic National
Convention in Charleston, a long-shot bid quickly quashed
when the national party recognized Tammany Hall, not Mozart
Hall, as the New York Democratic delegation. Yet Wood
decided to travel to Charleston anyway, subsidizing the travel
expenses of his allies if they protested Mozart Hall’s exclusion.
Knowing that his Irish base had little national influence, Wood
focused more on highlighting his shared political interests
with the South. As previously established,Wood employed this
strategy in his 1859 mayoral campaign with success, and in
the leadup to the 1860 party convention he doubled down on
that strategy. His public letters with Virginia Governor Henry
Wise supporting his state’s execution of John Brown sought to
demonstrate his allegiance to the South and its political wishes,
and made him the Southern delegates’ favorite candidate for
Vice President, with many willing to lobby on his behalf. For
example, Fred Aiken, the secretary of the 1860 Democratic
convention and another Northerner with Southern sympathies,
pledged to “use my best ability to affect the public mind of
the South still more favorably in your behalf ” so Wood would
become Vice President.44
Wood now hoped to be nominated as Vice President
for John C. Breckinridge, President Buchanan’s sitting Vice
President, who Wood called “a live & ambitious man, with a
clear excellent & geographic status” to advance his candidacy.45
But Breckinridge, and his alliance with Southern “ultras,” best
known for their support for secession over the past decade,
made him anathema to much of the North. Tammany Hall
publicly backed Stephen Douglas, whose popular sovereignty
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was increasingly anathema to much of the South. Wood,
perhaps, could have helped convince his Southern allies to
support Douglas as their standard-bearer. However, Wood
refused, publicly calling Douglas the “bob-tailed pony from
Illinois.”46 Tammany Hall would not compromise either,
supporting a resolution to mandate two-thirds of the delegates
endorse the nominee. The goal of the resolution was to prevent
a Southern candidate from winning a simple majority without
any Northern support, but the plan backfired when Stephen
Douglas was unable to reach two-thirds as well.
After 57 failed ballots the convention was postponed,
and a second convention was called for Baltimore. An attempt
by Douglas to withdraw for a candidate capable of winning
Northern and Southern delegates when the Democrats met
again was rejected by Tammany Hall. With no hope of winning,
Breckinridge allies left the convention and nominated him
on a separate ticket, creating two rival Democratic campaigns
for the 1860 presidential election. Wood tried to work with
the two tickets to fuse in states where the Republicans would
win otherwise, but his efforts mostly failed. Lincoln would
be elected by a narrow plurality achieved by winning states
that Democrats, if united, would have otherwise won.47
While Wood’s more sympathetic biographer would wholly
blame Tammany, Wood’s other biographer, the generally
unsympathetic Samuel Pleasants, would wholly blame Wood.
This historiographical discrepancy shows how one’s view of
Wood clouds assigning blame for the Democratic debacle.48
Nevertheless, both sides of the New York Democratic divide
were principally responsible for the party’s split and loss because
they chose candidates that had no chance of winning and
refused to abandon them when this became clear.
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“The National Game. Three Outs and One Run.” Drawing depicting the four candidates of the 1860 United States presidential
election (L to R): John Bell, Stephen Douglas, John C. Breckinridge, and Abraham Lincoln.

Once Lincoln was elected, Wood faced new and
political challenges more dire than his fading national fortunes.
As mayor of New York City, his first major challenge in 1861
was deciding how to respond to the growing calls from his city’s
business community to forge some compromise to preserve
the Union and the city’s economic relationship with the South.
New York City’s business community was generally supportive
of Republican protectionist measures versus Democrat free
trade, but they worried that President Lincoln would stifle trade
with their biggest market, the South.49 Wood struggled to allay
their concerns; this tension would manifest most clearly before
the war in Fernando Wood’s infamous “Free City” speech. In
this speech, Wood advocated that New York City secede from
the state of New York and pledge neutrality in the inevitable
upcoming war between North and South. This speech would
share some similarities to William Reed’s previously discussed
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speech from the same winter. First, Wood argued that New
York City must stand “with our aggrieved brethren of the
slaves states” who they owe “friendly relations and common
sympathy.” Second, Wood argued that a free city status would
finally sever New York City from the wrongs of the state
leaders (who he claimed were more dangerous than Southern
secessionists) and attain security and prosperity. Finally, Wood
qualified his pronouncement, saying that no violence should be
utilized to help the city secede, but it should be done peacefully
once war began.50
What is most surprising about Wood’s speech is how
little notice it received at the moment. Partially this was the
result of few thinking a free city would be accomplished; in
fact, other than reported discussions with “certain wise men”
of the merchant community at Wood’s residence, no tangible
legislative or executive actions occurred.51 Yet this lack of
coverage may be due to a contemporary perception that the
speech was not as dubious as it appeared. Many biographers
of Wood, in fact, argue that his Free City speech was not
a controversial political manifesto, like Reed’s, but simply
either a “trial balloon” to see what rhetoric was permissible at
that unique moment of history or a simple continuation of
New York’s downstate-upstate feud.52 Feuds regarding “home
rule” for New York City, how much control the city should
have independent of state oversight, were constant. This
intrastate tension flared every time new taxes were debated
or new regulations were proposed, every time legislative
reapportionment was necessary, and especially every time that
political patronage was doled out. Wood’s three terms as mayor
were defined by a rivalry between New York City and the
rest of the state that, even today, often transcends party lines.
Therefore, Wood’s speech is often described as little more than
perhaps an ill-timed continuation of this conflict, and not an
accurate reflection of his ideological attitudes.
However, this argument is dubious since this would not
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be the end of Wood’s questionable actions and rhetoric towards
the South in the months before the war. His prior Thanksgiving
proclamation urged citizens to pray that Republicans stop
violating “the federal compact.”53 He issued a formal apology
in January to the Governor of Georgia when New York state
authorities found 25 muskets were heading south to aid the
rebellion.54 His brother even demanded “total acquiescence in
all Southern demands.”55 Some of Wood’s allies and base were
even secession apologists. At a December 15th meeting, some
Democrats passed a resolution extending “heartfelt sympathy”
to Southerners “engaged in the holy cause of American liberty
and trying to hold back the avalanche of Britishism…”56 It
seemed that Wood and his allies would be a constant thorn in
the side of Unionists until reconciliation was achieved.
As Wood ignited controversy and division, the city’s
Republican Party sought to resolve its own internal divisions.
For the decade before Wood’s controversial speech, parties in
opposition to the Democratic majority in New York City would
be too divided or controversial to reap the benefits of these
divisions. By 1860, what had originally been a loose union
of people united only by their opposition to Democrats was
now a formalized Republican Party, but like Democrats, the
Republicans had their own factions. The party was divided by
a debate about whether to lean more towards its Whig Party
roots or its Free-Soil Party roots. The former wanted a greater
focus on economic issues like tariffs or infrastructure, hallmarks
of the Whig ethos, and less on the South and slavery, the issues
that destroyed the Whig Party. The latter, some of whom were
once Democrats, wanted the focus on slavery and Southern
expansionism.
This divide was often correlated with newspaper
consumption. Whigs, who favored accommodation with KnowNothings and former Democrats, read Horace Greeley’s New
York Tribune. Those who wanted the party wholly Whiggish
read Henry Raymond’s New York Times. What saved these
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factions from destroying the national party as Democrats did
was that they all agreed to work for Abraham Lincoln’s election,
even though many had originally supported New York’s own,
William Seward, especially the Raymond faction. Lincoln
winning New York and defeating the Democratic candidates
nationwide was more important to both than settling intraparty
scores.57 That does not mean the Raymond faction was
happy; in fact, in a bitter New York Times article reflecting
on the convention, the paper referred to Lincoln’s backers as
“recusants” and thought so little of Lincoln that they referred to
him as “Abram Lincoln.”58
The rivalry between Raymond and Greeley was not just
ideological, it was also personal. Raymond used to work under
Greeley and for his New York Tribune but left after he became
fed up with Greeley’s public embrace of social experiments like
utopian socialism. Not only did he start his own competing
paper, the New York Times, but he stole more than a dozen
workers from Greeley, who for decades afterwards continuously
referred to Raymond as “the Little Villain.” For the next two
decades, their papers would bitterly compete for economic
supremacy in the city, with Greeley’s high-strung editorial style
and greater political radicalism keeping him ahead of Raymond
for much of that time. Politically, however, Greeley was less
successful against his nemesis. In 1854, both sought the Whig
nomination for the lieutenant governorship of New York, with
Raymond winning thanks to the backing of William Seward.
Greeley, of course, would get the last pre-war laugh against
Seward in that regard, though both Raymond and Greeley
continued to jockey, as we will see unsuccessfully, in the years
after.59
The secession crisis brought the schism back as both
party’s factions presented contrasting proposals for how to
proceed, making it all but impossible to wholeheartedly attack
Wood and his free city speech. Thurlow Weed, a close ally of
Seward and Raymond, proposed that secession be averted by
calling for a national convention that would constitutionally
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enshrine the Missouri Compromise and the Compromise
of 1850. While this proposal was seeming to limit some
westward extension, it would have led to the unstated result of
permanently protecting slavery in the Southern states.60 Horace
Greeley and his allies vehemently rejected Weed’s proposal,
saying that accommodation would delegitimize the entire
antislavery stand. Greeley asked all New York City Republican
Congressmen to go on record favoring “prompt and energetic
enforcement of all the laws of the general government” as the
way to ensure “the safety of the country” and “the preservation
of the Union.” Though they rejected Greeley’s proclamation,
none explicitly endorsed Weed’s proposals either.61 Once the
war began, it would become common for New York City
Republicans to paper over this resistance to aggression and their
support for some accommodations. Yet in due time, desires for
accommodation would return with a vengeance at the war’s
climax.
Clearly, in the years before the Civil War internal
disputes dominated both the Republican and Democratic
parties of New York City. It has already been established
that the Tammany Hall-Mozart Hall feud even had national
consequences, aiding in the election of Abraham Lincoln
and weakening the influence of Mayor Wood. His actions
after the election of Lincoln, especially his Free City speech,
caused further damage to his power. Though the clash between
Republican coalitions did not have the same negative national
consequences, in part because both sides went out of their way
to accommodate the nomination of Lincoln and work towards
his election, that does not mean the divide was any less severe.
Its Whiggish wing, embodied by Henry Raymond and the
New York Times and its Free Soiler wing, embodied by Horace
Greeley and the New York Tribune, disagreed mightily over
the direction the party should take regarding what issues to
prioritize, what policies to support, and what base of political
support they should cultivate.
Both Philadelphia and New York, already established as,
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despite their political diversity, broadly sympathetic to Southern
attitudes and positions,changed their rhetoric dramatically with
the attack on Fort Sumter April 12th, 1861. In Philadelphia,
excited crowds began peacefully roaming the streets to debate
the latest reports from the South and exclaim their glee at the
prospect of war. Quickly however, these gatherings became
more sinister in behavior. According to the Philadelphia Public
Ledger, originally an anti-slavery newspaper that under new
ownership became virulently pro-Confederate until it was
sold in 1864, “everyone who hinted any sympathy with the
secession was made to make an unequivocal stand.” Some, like
an intoxicated man who in a drunken stupor made the mistake
of declaring himself a Southern sympathizer, went unharmed
after leading “three cheers for the thirty United States.”62 After
a local newspaper published the names and addresses of several
wealthy Southerners, these crowds marched to their homes,
demanding shows of patriotism. When one of the Southerners,
Colonel Robert Patterson, refused, his windows were smashed.
Others deemed disloyal took refuge in the Court House or fled
to police protection. Those unable to flee in time were roughed
up, with reports of one man having his clothes ripped off and
another having his head put in a noose.63
To stem the growing violence, Mayor Henry put his
political fortunes on the line again with his use of his powers
over the city police. On April 15th, a pro-Union mob “swelled
to many hundreds” outside the office of a notoriously proSouthern newspaper, the Palmetto Flag, seeking more violence
against Southern sympathizers. Henry arrived with the chief
of police and the Reserve Corps to restore order. As the crowd
clamored for a speech, Henry deftly calmed the crowd with the
following:
Your devotion to the flag of your country satisfies me
that you are equally devoted to the maintenance of the
laws, and to the preservation of order. I see that there
are no traitors among you, and I rejoice to know that
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treason cannot rear its head in this city. The flag is
an emblem of the Government, and I hope that all
citizens who feel loyal to it will show their respect for
it and the laws and retire to their respective homes. 64
							

When the crowds dispersed but regathered the next day
at the home of the infamous William Reed, Henry went one
step farther to protect Southern allies. Reed of course was no
friend of Henry and those who supported the Peoples Party,
and afterwards Reed refused to thank the Mayor for his help.65
Yet in his remarks outside Reed’s home, Henry threatened the
crowd, ordering the police to shoot to kill to maintain order if
the crowd did not disperse. The next day, he issued an executive
proclamation asking residents to identify any persons suspected
of aiding the enemy. This order required “that all persons shall
refrain from assembly…unlawfully, riotously, or tumultuously,
warning them that the same will be at their peril.”66 For Henry,
order and loyalty were one and the same. Active secessionists
in his city and rioting anti-secessionists were both disloyal to
him, their city, and the new war effort. Rather than alienate
Unionists with his executive crackdown, Henry’s popularity
skyrocketed, and the city calmed. By April 18th, the streets
were clear and Union flags adorned the homes of those of all
political persuasions. While some Southerners left town, most
retreated into silence, knowing that they were outnumbered,
but protected if they kept quiet. 67
Philadelphia also decided to invest in its own military
protection, creating a Philadelphia Home Guard. Philadelphia’s
social elite worked with Mayor Henry to create a civil defense
force under his control that would be independent of the
city’s forces under the federal government which Lincoln
was beginning to deploy against the Confederacy. As the
founders of the Philadelphia Home Guard explained in a
public proclamation from April 19th, just one week after Fort
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Sumter, “those of our citizens whose ties prevent them from
undertaking active service, should lose no time in organizing
a ‘Home Guard’ to be in readiness to repel external aggression
and to maintain internal order.” They would go on to say
that the Home Guard would be created by the people: only
city residents, not the state or the federal government, would
be responsible for volunteering, training, finances, etc.68 The
founders included prominent members of the city’s social
and economic elite. For them, publicly, the Home Guard was
simply a way for those too old for active service or unable to
leave their businesses behind to help the war effort.

A depiction of the Volunteer Refreshment Saloon
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania during the American
Civil War.

However, the Home Guard would also have two ulterior
purposes that would serve the city and the Union war effort
more than the older gentlemen ever would have militarily in
case of an invasion. First and foremost, the Home Guard could
be an extension of the Mayor’s police forces. Henry Charles
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Lea intimated as much in a later private letter to Mayor Henry,
saying that with his support the Home Guard will “hold
themselves…to obey any orders you may give for service”
within the city.69 Henry had already demonstrated that he was
willing to use his police powers to maintain order in the city,
and that police presence was effective. Now, he would have
some of the city’s most recognizable and powerful leaders aiding
in that effort. Second, the Home Guard would be a tangible
mechanism for the city’s leaders, supportive of the Union
but skeptical about the war effort, to have their voices heard
and their impact felt. Many members of the Home Guard,
including Lea, were initially skeptical of Henry and his policies,
even publicly questioning his spending and infrastructure
priorities in 1860.70 As powerful businessmen, most had close
economic and social connections to the South, like their
aforementioned New York City counterparts, and would
therefore have some justification for neutrality towards the
war effort. Instead, the Home Guard prevented neutrality, and
would, until the creation of the Union League in the next year
, be the primary mechanism for helping them stay supportive
and loyal.
It is unmistakable that the coming of the Civil War
was a blessing for Mayor Henry’s political prospects. Though
Henry had originally hoped his term could avoid national
debates, the war undeniably strengthened his control over
Philadelphia and its politics. Before the war, he was severely
weakened, arguably only winning re-election because of voter
fraud. He had also proven unable to convince Philadelphia
voters that his political vision, a party between that of the
Democrats and Republicans, was a worthwhile course for the
city. Yet thanks to the war, Henry had a new political mandate.
His use of the police to foster order, reviled before the war, was
appreciated by both sides for preventing violence and mayhem.
Additionally, he worked diligently to foster political alliances
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with war supporters who may have disagreed with him on other
political issues. By inviting them into his coalition, perhaps best
embodied by the forming of the Home Guard, his new allies
had a vested interest in supporting his administration and his
policies. This support even extended once Henry started voicing
some more controversial opinions, granting Henry a veneer of
bipartisanship and moderation that would severely hamper his
opponents’ political efforts.
Residents and attitudes in New York City also saw a
sea change in sentiment after Fort Sumter. At a massive rally
on April 20th, an estimated 50,000 packed Union Square
for a public pro-war meeting carried out by a wide and
bipartisan group of the city’s political and economic leaders.
Organizers included all three mayoral candidates in 1859,
Havemeyer, Opdyke, and Wood, and the dueling Republican
newspapermen, Henry Raymond and Horace Greeley.
Tammany Hall would soon take their own actions, formally
adopting resolutions declaring they were “heartily united to
uphold the constitution, enforce the laws, maintain the Union,
defend the flag…the Union must and shall be preserved.”71 For
the most part, Tammany Hall would publicly remain strong
Unionists throughout the war, highlighting their views on the
war to deflect later charges of disloyalty from both parties.
In the battle of the presses, Horace Greeley gained an edge,
according to noted diarist George Templeton Strong, since “the
Greeley wing of Republicanism” was the chief driver of war in
the first place, leaving Raymond’s “conservative” wing looking
like a follower. Greeley’s harsh rhetoric towards the South
long before Fort Sumter was vindicated by the attack, while
Raymond’s moderation, plus his ally Seward’s desire for political
compromise, were now obsolete as the nation sought revenge
against the “‘chivalric’ bullies and braggarts” of the South.72
Even Fernando Wood was swept up in the patriotic
fervor. On April 15th, he issued a proclamation summoning
citizens “irrespective of all other considerations and prejudices”
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to obey the law, preserve order, and protect property. Attending
the city’s first “Union Rally” the next day, he literally draped
himself with the American flag while exhorting “every man,
whatever had been his sympathies, to make one great phalanx
in this controversy, to proceed to conquer a peace. I am with
you in this contest. We have no party now.” He made similar
remarks at the rally on the 20th and proposed a special milliondollar tax to support the war effort and create a “Mozart
Regiment” under his command.73 To some, this sudden
transformation was clearly a sham and a political ploy, with one
unnamed critic growling “The cunning scoundrel sees which
way the cat is jumping, and put himself right on the record in
a vague, general way, giving the least offense to his allies of the
Southern Democracy.” Wood, perhaps indicating this hedging,
argued in that same flag-draped speech that whether the Union
would be reunited “by fratricidal warfare or by concession,
conciliation, and sacrifice” was still unanswered.74
Regardless, Wood clearly hoped that his party and his
base, like he was publicly trying to do, could support the war
without having to support all of Lincoln’s policies. He also
hoped they could do so within the new demands of loyalty
to the Union. Yet, voices remained within the Democratic
Party that rejected the entire legitimacy of the war and any
bipartisan accommodations with it or Lincoln. Wood’s brother,
Benjamin, was perhaps the loudest of these voices. Benjamin
Wood directly opposed his brother’s transformation, using the
Daily News, of which he was now the sole editor due to his
brother’s re-election, to scold Mozart Hall’s war platform, and
maintaining that only “friends of Peace’’ were true Democrats.75
In this battle between the Woods, the publisher would beat the
politician. Mozart Hall formally endorsed Benjamin Wood’s
sentiments, though they would agree to work with Tammany
Hall on nominating a united slate in the fall elections if
possible. This defeat by his own organization would send a
chilling message for Fernando Wood about straying from his
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new political base, a message he would long remember going
forward.
The fact that such a vocal minority of Southern
sympathizers persisted surely damaged New York City’s overall
loyalty to the war effort. Yet perhaps most significantly, New
York City would not have a similar institution or organization
as effective as Philadelphia’s Home Guard. A bipartisan Union
Defense Committee, of which Fernando Wood was initially
an ex-officio member and active participant, was formed
shortly after Fort Sumter by the city Chamber of Commerce.
Their stated goal was to serve “in aid of the Government in
the present crisis, to accelerate and facilitate the organization
of forces, the transportation of troops and provisions, and the
cooperation of popular action in all loyal parts of the country.”76
But, its impact and the creation of a Union Party in September
1861 were only successful primarily upstate.77 Tammany Hall,
despite agreeing with most of Lincoln’s war policies before
emancipation, also never publicly considered allying with the
city’s Republican Party.
Therefore, there was no formal infrastructure or alliance
in place for much of the war to ensure that the city’s elite
who were generally supportive of the war, but not of Lincoln
and some of his policies, had buy-in to the war effort. There
was nothing to ensure their loyalty and continued support.
In those crucial early days, a bipartisan consensus like that of
Philadelphia could have been achieved, but it was not. Wood
also refused to use his executive authority in the same way as
Henry did to silence dissent and maintain order. For instance, a
June editorial by his brother claimed that Northerners had been
tricked into supporting the war effort, and now they had to
turn against the war and ensure conciliation.78
Under Wood’s leadership in 1861, not only would the
Democratic Party not unite in its role as “the loyal opposition,”
but its anti-war voices were as loud, powerful, and effective at
rallying their base as ever. It was at this point that New York
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City and Philadelphia both began to irrevocably diverge on
their journey through the war. Philadelphia came out of the
first few months more united and peaceful than before, while
New York City remained as divided as ever, if not more than
before. The blame for the continued divisiveness of New York
City politics is not solely Wood’s, but he played a crucial role.
Though he had publicly backed much of the pro-war zeal that
engulfed the city after the attack on Fort Sumter, he privately
capitulated to his anti-war backers, especially his own brother.
Furthermore, unlike his counterpart in Philadelphia, he did
not seek to foster bipartisan loyalty to the war effort or allow
his political coalition to grow with pro-war voices. By and large
and in part thanks to Wood, New York City’s political situation
looked little different in the fall of 1861 than it did in the
winter of 1861.
New York City, additionally, had a crucial and divisive
mayoral election to endure that year, another reason for its
continued political divisions. The fact that Philadelphia had no
major elections in the fall of 1861 is another major reason why
it remained peaceful and united. Other than a congressional
special election won by a Democrat, Charles Biddle, there
were few opportunities for partisan electoral conflict that
could break the bipartisanship. This gave Henry time and
resources to realize his mayoral vision and find common
ground with allies and enemies. He could show the people of
Philadelphia why they wanted his moderate Unionism and
strong police power. Additionally, without major elections,
the city’s Democrats had few opportunities to advance its
bench of potential elected officials. Thus, the Democratic Party
continued to highlight politicians of yesteryear, like William
Reed. Without constituents to serve, and thus their sentiments
to consider, these party elders even championed recognition of
the Confederacy as an independent nation.79 As Philadelphians
were beginning to send their sons and fathers off the war,
these aging politicians seemed out-of-touch and elitist at best,
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treasonous at worst. In response, city residents painted the
entire city’s Democrats with a broad disloyal stroke that many
Democrats sought to soften by allying with Henry. It would
take another year for Philadelphia Democrats to elect new
leaders, but by then they were more focused on national issues
like emancipation and national forums like Congress, leaving
the bipartisan leadership of the city and alliances with Henry
intact.
As for New York City, Fernando Wood entered his reelection campaign in a precarious position. His “conversion”
to Unionism caused distrust and defections from Mozart
Hall without gaining him new allies. While his opponents
once again refused a coalition, both Tammany Hall and the
Republican Party were emboldened by the popularity of the
war, and both called for its vigorous execution. Tammany Hall
even declared at their state convention “the first and most
sacred duty of every man” is to “devote his energies and his
means, with all his heart and soul, to the earnest and resistless
prosecution of the war, until the rebellion is utterly suppressed.”
Furthermore, President Lincoln “is imperatively required...to
take every step...which may be necessary to secure the triumph
of our arms...and that his measures will be passed upon by a
generous and patriotic people...without party spirit.”80 Boldly,
every Tammany candidate statewide publicly endorsed these
sentiments.81 Tammany Hall was also emboldened by a new
interparty consensus. Unlike in 1859 when campaign attacks
were primarily directed at Havemeyer and Opdyke, Tammany
Hall and the GOP reached an unofficial détente, training their
fire solely on Wood, his views on the war, and his policies.82
Wood’s chances were further diminished when he was
credibly accused of corruptly doling out city contracts to close
allies, while also using city finances for electioneering and
public election funds for personal gain.83 Severely weakened,
Wood went to two tried and true methods when a political
position may be popular, but the candidate is not. First, and
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more successfully, he publicly decried his investigations as
politically motivated. He zeroed in on accusations that the
city’s Corporation Attorney investigated him to advance
his candidacy for District Attorney, forcing him to publicly
renounce his candidacy.84 Second, he nationalized his race. On
November 29th, a week before Election Day, Wood changed
the tenor of his campaign and his ultimate political destiny
with a speech at Volks Garten. Casting off any prior support
for the war effort, Wood charged the Lincoln administration
with the intention of prolonging the war “as long as there is
a dollar to be stolen from the National Treasury or a drop of
Southern blood to be shed.” He also charged Lincoln and the
Republican Party with being in favor of abolition so free black
workers could compete with poor white laborers. To Wood,
the Republican Party hoped for the destruction of immigrants,
especially his base, since “They will get the Irishmen and
Germans to fill up the regiments and go forth to defend the
country…they will themselves remain at home to divide the
plunder.”85
In this speech, Wood publicly relitigated his favorite
political talking points, especially support for the South and for
immigrants, specifically Irish and German. Yet privately, Wood
refused to wholly denounce his prior Unionism. In a curious
development, the same day that he gave his Volks Garten
speech he also fired off a defensive letter to Secretary of State
and fellow New Yorker William Seward. Despite what others
were saying about him, he was “for a vigorous prosecution of
the war, for sustaining the administration by every power at
our command and for the restoration of peace only if it can be
done consistently with the safety, honor, and unity of the entire
government.”86 Even with a Republican in the race, Wood
claimed that he deserved their support for his campaign since
he best articulated Unionist ideals.
There are two possible reasons for this letter. One
is that Wood sincerely believed that, despite his history of
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controversial comments, including his speech that very day, he
was loyal to the Union and deserving of Lincoln’s support. That
idea prompts another question, why this or the fairly pleasant
reply from Seward’s son thanking Wood for his support for
the Union, were not released to the public, which could have
swayed enough skeptics to re-embrace him? Thus, the second
reason is most likely: Wood was simply a shrewd politician,
cynically hoping to utilize the Lincoln administration and
its vast political resources, or at least keep them from being
used against him. The fact that no evidence exists of Lincoln
or Seward publicly bashing Wood during the campaign or
diverting energy to helping elect the Republican indicates that
Wood’s letter may have been effective. For example, Seward
did not respond to entreaties from the New York Metropolitan
Police, a force under state Republican control, to arrest Wood
for the content of his speech.87 Furthermore, Thurlow Weed
had privately requested a meeting with Wood the month before
“if it would not make too much talk,” perhaps to discuss the
race, though no record exists of if the meeting occurred.88
However, the lack of effort may also indicate that the
Lincoln administration had little confidence a Republican
could be elected as Mayor of New York City; and, there was
good reason to assume this. The Republicans had once again
nominated George Opdyke. A wealthy clothing manufacturer,
his primary pre-war income came from selling clothes to
slaves down South, and his Whiggish politics inspired few
allies. He did gain some Republican approval after his 1859
loss for working with loyal businessmen during the secession
crisis to prevent the city’s businessmen from committing “a
compromise of principle” to assuage the South.89 But, as a
vocal Republican, he faced constant labeling by Democrats as a
“black Republican” hoping to emancipate blacks and subjugate
whites.90 Like Wood, he was also perceived as a politician
first, civic leader second. George Templeton Strong, though a
Republican, nonetheless described him as a “pushing, intriguing
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man, fond of power and position.”91
The enigma in the race was the Tammany Hall
candidate, Charles Godfrey Gunther. Like Opdyke, he was
a rich merchant. Thus, many assumed he would be closer in
policy outlook and personality to the Fifth Avenue Democrats.
However, Gunther was a prominent German activist and
organizer. Though Wood was primarily concerned with the
Irish, German immigrants made up a prominent part of his
anti-war coalition, so it was assumed that Gunther could bring
parts of Mozart Hall’s base back into Tammany Hall. As for
Gunther’s appeal to pro-war Democrats, that was less clear.
Civil War historian Ernest McKay claims that despite being a
member of Tammany Hall, the “War Democrats,” on specific
war policies Gunther differed little from the Woods.92 Thus,
he too inspired little confidence amongst New Yorkers. In the
end, many New Yorkers cared little about which anti-Wood
faction won, so long as Wood was gone. As New York political
historian Sidney Brummer put it, in the minds of many critics
of Wood and his policies, “Whether to vote for Opdyke or
for Gunther, was with many simply a question of which had a
better chance of defeating Wood.”93
Election Day finally came on December 3rd, 1861,
and few intimated to guess who would win. Each candidates’
headquarters were packed well into the morning. Through the
night, each group alternated between pessimism and optimism.
As a potentially foreboding sign, when Opdyke arrived at his
headquarters early the next morning, someone gave off an alarm
that the floor was collapsing. Panic ensued, with some suffering
bruises and torn clothes.94 Early returns indicated a Gunther
victory, but by ten a.m. Opdyke was declared the winner with
little more than six hundred votes over Gunther and 1200 over
Wood. Opdyke won nine of the city’s wards, mostly dominated
by Republicans, but he also embarrassingly won Wood’s home
ward by one percent and did especially well in wards populated
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by former Know Nothings. Gunther, as expected, won the four
German wards from Wood, but did not win all of the Irish
wards, splitting them with Wood costing Tammany Hall the
race.95 Without the Democratic split, especially over immigrant
votes, it is safe to assume either Wood or Gunther would have
easily won, but with the split New York City had just had
its closest three-way race ever and elected its first Republican
mayor. In what must have been an awkward transition, Wood
and Opdyke civilly exchanged letters and agreed to meet at
some point in December.96
Perhaps real change could be imparted on the city’s
policies and its relationships with the war effort and Albany.
Some Republicans were optimistic, with Henry Bellows
regarding Opdyke’s election as “an augury of national
strength.”97 Some, like Strong, while happy that Wood lost, saw
Opdyke as little more than the lesser of evils.98 But most were
worried. Even with a Republican mayor, the Republicans who
controlled Albany were unlikely to grant more power to the
city, most remaining appointed and elected municipal officials
were Tammany or Mozart allies, and there was still a hotbed
of anti-war, anti-black, anti-Lincoln newspapers and activism
throughout the city. To say that Opdyke’s tenure would be
divisive and contested would be an understatement, though
what happened would likely have been more tumultuous
than most would have anticipated.99 If 1861 was a year for
Republican gains and Democratic divisions, in both cities, then
1862 and 1863 would show the power Democrats could yield
if they united, but also the dangers that unity posed and how
fragile it would be.
This work has sought to compare and contrast New
York City and Philadelphia politics by looking at how the
cities, in similar positions demographically, politically, and
socially before the war, reacted to the conflict. The primary
framework for doing so has been examining how political
actors in both cities, from elected officials and party leaders to
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everyday voters, defined loyalty and disloyalty during an event
so all-encompassing and divisive. It is without a doubt that
in both cities, despite their differences by the end of the war,
some of the same definitions were utilized. Additionally, some
of the same ideological arguments were made in both cities,
often by members of the same political party. Both cities also
endured intraparty feuds that ensured that claims of loyalty
and disloyalty were not just lobbed at partisan opponents, but
intraparty ones as well. In writing on Philadelphia during the
American Civil War period, one hundred years later, historian
William Dusinberre framed Philadelphia as a city that entered
the conflict weak and bitter. The city was “fiercely jealous
of New York,” but also of other cities like Boston and New
Orleans that had usurped its national and global economic
output. Its only reliable trading partner was the South, and they
were now leaving the Union. For decades, it had struggled to
integrate its ethnically and racially diverse inhabitants into the
city. These internal tensions led to nativist riots in the 1840s
and a black population, the largest in the North, with few
economic or social opportunities. It also had a fragile municipal
government led by a weak mayor, even after it consolidated
with its outlying counties in 1854. All in all, there were many
reasons why many Philadelphia residents had an inferiority
complex towards their Northern neighbors.100
The central question of this paper, therefore, has been
why did Philadelphia and New York City diverge so sharply
and if and how did conceptions of loyalty and disloyalty play
a role? Philadelphia’s success at avoiding much of the turmoil
that befell New York City was due to the leadership of its
wartime mayor, Alexander Henry. First and foremost, Henry
took what was once considered a weakness of the municipal
government of Philadelphia, that as mayor his primary means
of influence was control over the police, and turned it into
a positive. Philadelphia easily could have descended into the
divisiveness and bloodshed of its northern neighbor, and nearly
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did because it too possessed a loud and somewhat popular antiwar faction. But it did not, largely because Henry repeatedly,
fairly, and unequivocally utilized his police powers to maintain
order.101 He also ruled in a bipartisan manner, avoiding many
of the contentious and divisive issues of the day. His party,
first known as the People’s Party and then the Union Party,
allowed members of different political persuasions to feel
included and heard in city governance as elected officials,
members of the Home Guard, and in unofficial capacities. At
times, especially immediately before Fort Sumter, both of these
political values made Henry unpopular with both sides, but as
the war progressed his deft handling of the city granted him
easy electoral success because more Philadelphians than not
were invested in the well-being of their city. It is no wonder
then that Dusinberre, writing a century after Henry retired in
January of 1866 (mayoral terms had been extended to three
years during his reign and elections moved to the fall), declared
that “Alexander Henry’s conduct of the police force from
1858 to 1865 in itself shows him to have been the best mayor
Philadelphia ever had.”102
To conclude, this examination of the years 1859-1861
promised no easy answers about the types of definitions of
loyalty and disloyalty employed during the Civil War, nor about
the reasons why each city ended up on the trajectory it did. As
I stated earlier, throughout the war there was no simple answer
about what loyalty and disloyalty meant, and therefore there
is no simple reason for the fates of the actors and groups from
Philadelphia and New York City that have been discussed.
In the end, we must recognize that even if we treat the years
around the Civil War as being on some clear arc destined to
bend in a certain direction, there will always be bumps and
always be outliers. All historians and readers of the era can do
is try to pull back the curtain of time, reevaluate long standing
historical assumptions, increase the prominence of forgotten
leaders and groups of people, and try to understand it all to the
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best we can, as I have sought to do in this thesis.
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